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Abstract
We present a new technique, boundless memory blocks, that automatically eliminates
buffer overflow errors, enabling programs to continue to execute through memory
errors without memory corruption.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are caused by programming errors that allow an
attacker to cause the program to write beyond the bounds of an allocated memory
block to corrupt other data structures. The standard way to exploit a buffer overflow
vulnerability involves a request that is too large for the buffer intended to hold it.
The buffer overflow error causes the program to write part of the request beyond the
bounds of the buffer, corrupting the address space of the program and causing the
program to execute injected code contained in the request.
Our boundless memory blocks compiler inserts checks that dynamically detect all
out of bounds accesses. When it detects an out of bounds write, it stores the value
away in a hash. Our compiler can then return the stored value as the result of an out
of bounds read to that address. In the case of uninitialized addresses, our compiler
simply returns a predefined value.
We have acquired several widely used open source applications (Apache, Send-
mail, Pine, Mutt, and Midnight Commander). With standard compilers, all of these
applications are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks as documented at security track-
ing web sites. Instead, our compiler enables the applications to execute successfully
through buffer overflow attacks to continue to correctly service user requests with-
out security vulnerabilities. We have also found that only one application contains
uninitialized reads, which means that in most cases, the net effect of our compiler is
to (conceptually) give each allocated memory block unbounded size and to eliminate
out of bounds accesses as a programming error.
Thesis Supervisor: Martin C. Rinard
Title: Associate Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Standard programming languages (C, Java, C++) allow programmers to create and
then access memory blocks (such as buffers, objects, structs, or arrays) of a fixed
size. A attempt by the program to use a reference to a block to access memory
outside the block is considered to be a programming error. The meaning of a program
containing such an error varies from language to language. Java implementations, for
example, check all accesses and throw an exception if the program attempts to access
out of bounds data. The ANSI C standard, on the other hand, specifies that the
meaning of a program is undefined if it uses pointer arithmetic or other means to
access data outside of the block boundaries. In practice, most C implementations
do not check for out of bounds accesses, leaving C programs vulnerable to data
structure corruption errors that occur when an out of bounds access to one block
corrupts data stored in another block. Because the effect of these kinds of errors is so
dependent on aspects of the implementation (such as the layout of the data structures
in memory) that are outside of the basic programming model of the language, they
call be extremely difficult to reproduce and eliminate. And because they can corrupt
language implementation structures such as return addresses and function pointers,
they often leave the program vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks, which attackers
can exploit to inject and execute arbitrary code over the network.
In this thesis we present a different approach, boundless memory blocks, to out of
bounds accesses. We generate code that checks all accesses, but instead of allowing
13
out of bounds accesses to corrupt other data structures or responding to out of bounds
accesses by throwing an exception, the generated code takes actions that allow the
program to continue to execute without interruption. Specifically, it stores the values
of out of bounds writes in a hash table indexed under the written address (expressed
as an offset relative to an identifier for the written block). It can then return the
stored value as the result of out of bounds reads to that address. It simply returns
a value from a predefined sequence for out of bounds reads that access uninitialized
addresses.
Conceptually, our technique gives each memory block unbounded size. The initial
memory block size can therefore be seen not as a hard boundary that the programmer
must get; right for the program to execute correctly, but rather as a flexible hint to
the implementation of the amount of memory that the programmer may expect the
program to use in common cases.
We have developed a C compiler that implements boundless memory blocks and
used this compiler to generate code for a collection of widely used server programs
drawn from the open-source Linux community. As documented at security tracking
web sites such as http://www.securityfocus.com and http://www.securiteam.
con, all of these programs have security vulnerabilities related to out of bounds ac-
cesses such as buffer overflow errors. Our results show that the use of boundless
memory blocks makes these programs invulnerable to these security vulnerabilities
and that the overhead associated with using boundless memory blocks is acceptable
in practice.
Note that boundless memory blocks have the potential to introduce a new denial of
service security vulnerability: the possibility that an attacker may be able to produce
an input that will cause the program to generate a very large number of out of bounds
writes and therefore consume all of the available memory. We address this problem by
treating the hash table that stores out of bounds writes as a fixed-size least recently
used (LRU) cache. This bounds the amount of memory that an attacker can cause
out of bounds writes to consume.
This thesis makes the following contributions:
14
* Boundless Memory Blocks: It introduces the concept of using boundless
memory blocks to eliminate problems (security errors, data structure corruption,
premature program termination due to thrown exceptions) currently caused by
fixed-size memory blocks.
* Implementation: It shows how to implement boundless memory blocks in a
compiler that is capable of generating code for unmodified legacy C programs.
* Evaluation: We evaluate how well boundless memory blocks work in practice
by generating versions of widely used open source server programs. Our results
show that boundless memory blocks make these program invulnerable to secu-
rity vulnerabilities (such as buffer overflows) caused by out of bounds memory
accesses and that the overhead of using boundless memory blocks is acceptable
for this set of programs.
15
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Chapter 2
Example
We start; by presenting a very simple example that illustrates how computations with
boundless memory blocks operate. Figure 2-1 presents a C program that computes
the sum of all positive integers found in an input file. During initialization, the
program allocates an array of size 100. Then, it starts reading the input file, and
whenever it finds a positive integer, it adds it to the array and updates the sum. In
the end, the program prints all the integers in the array, followed by their sum.
Since the program doesn't check whether there are too many positive integers in
the input file, the program will write past the end of the allocated array whenever the
file contains more than 100 positive integers. While in this case the program usually
terminates with a segmentation fault, an attacker may be able to fabricate a request
that corrupts other potential data structures or language implementation structures,
leaving the system vulnerable to executing arbitrary code contained in the malicious
request.
Our boundless memory blocks compiler automatically extends the size of the array
by hashing all out of bounds writes on line 20, and returning them to the correspond-
ing out of bounds reads on lines 21 and 26. However, in order to avoid a denial of
service vulnerability, by allowing an attacker to come up with a file that will consume
all of the available memory, we restrict the size of the hash, by implementing it as a
fixed-size LRU cache. In this case, the compiler will return a predefined value every
time the program tries to read a location which is not in the cache. Note that even
17
in this case, our simple program will compute the sum correctly, although the actual
array will contain some invalid integer values.
Every time an out of bounds read or write is detected, the compiler (optionally)
writes into a log file the type of the out of bounds access (new write, overwrite, read
from the cache, uninitialized read), its address in memory, its location (source file
and line number), the ID of the process that generated it, and the time at which the
out of bounds access was detected. This allows the developer to inspect the invalid
accesses, and to correct the associated errors if desired.
1. #include <stdio.h>
2.
3. #define N 10
4.
5. int main() {
6.
7. FILE *f = fopen("input.txt", r");
8. if (f == NULL) {
9. printf("Error opening input file.\n");
10. return;
11. }
12.
13. int *p; // an array of integers
14. int n = 0; // the actual size of the array
15. int i, aux, sum = 0;
16. p = (int*) malloc(N*sizeof(int));
17.
18. while (fscanf(f, "%d", &aux) != EOF)
19. if (aux > 0) {
20. *(p+n) = aux;
21. sum += *(p+n);
22. n++;
23. }
24.
25. for (i=0; i<n; i++)
26. printf("Integer %d: %d\n", i+1, *(p+i));
27.
28. printf("The sum of the integers in the input file is %d\n", sum);
29.
30. return 0;
31. }
Figure 2-1: A Simple Example
We next present an example extracted from the Mutt mail client discussed in
Section 4.4. Figure 2-2 presents a somewhat simplified version of a procedure from
18
Mutt which takes as input a string encoded in the UTF-8 format and returns as
output the same string encoded in modified UTF-7 format. This conversion may
increase the size of the string; the problem is that the procedure fails to allocate
sufficient space in the return string for the worst-case size increase. Specifically, the
procedure assumes a worst-case increase ratio of 2; the actual worst-case ratio is 7/2.
When passed (the very rare) inputs with large increase ratios, the procedure attempts
to write beyond the end of its output array.
With standard compilers, these writes succeed, corrupt the address space, and
the program crashes with a segmentation violation. To eliminate the possibility of
this kind of corruption, researchers have developed safe-C compilers that generate
code that dynamically checks for and intercepts out of bounds accesses. With such
compilers, Mutt exits with an out of bounds access error and does not even start
the user interface. With boundless memory blocks, the program stores the additional
writes away in a hash table, enabling the mail server to correctly translate the string
and continue to execute correctly. Again, the developers are able to inspect the log
file generated by our compiler, and to correct the errors if desired.
These examples illustrate two key aspects of using boundless memory blocks:
* Subtle Errors: To successfully specify a hard limit for each memory block,
the programmer must reason about how all executions of the program can pos-
sibly access memory. The difficulty of performing this reason means that, in
practice, real-world programs often contain subtle memory errors that can be
very difficult to detect by either testing or code inspection, and these errors can
have significant negative consequences for the program and its users.
* Different Aspects of Correctness: The fact that the programmer has failed
to correctly compute the maximum possible size of the memory block or to
check any possible overflows does not mean that the program as a whole is
incorrect. In fact, as these examples illustrate, the rest of the computation can
be completely correct once it is provided with conceptually unbounded memory
blocks.
19
static char *utf8_to-utf7 (const char *u8, size-t u81en) {
char *buf, *p;
int ch, int n, i, b = 0, k = 0, base64 = 0;
/* The following line allocates the return string.
The allocated string is too small; instead of
u8len * 2 +1, a safe length would be u8len * 4 + 1 */
p = buf = safemalloc u81en * 2 + 1);
while (u8len) {
unsigned char c = *u8;
if (c < Ox80) ch = c, n = 0;
else if (c < Oxc2) goto bail;
else if (c < OxeO) ch = c & Oxf, n = 1;
else if (c < OxfO) ch = c & OxOf, n = 2;
else if (c < Oxf8) ch = c & Ox07, n = 3;
else if (c < Oxfc) ch = c & Ox03, n = 4;
else if (c < Oxfe) ch = c & OxO1, n = 5;
else goto bail;
u8++, u81en--;
if (n > u8len) goto bail;
for (i = ; i < n; i++) {
if ((u8[i] & OxcO) != Ox80) goto bail;
ch = (ch << 6) I (u8[i] & Ox3f);
}
if (n > 1 && !(ch >> (n * 5 + ))) goto bail;
u8 += n, u81en -=n;
if (ch < Ox20 1[ ch >= Ox7f) {
if (!base64) {
*p++ = '&';
base64 = 1;
b = O;
k = 10;
}
if (ch & -Oxffff) ch = Oxfffe;
*p++ = B64Chars[b I ch >> k];
k -= 6;
for (; k >= ; k -= 6)
*p++ = B64Chars[(ch >> k) & Ox3f];
b = (ch << (-k)) & Ox3f;
k += 16;
} else {
if (base64) {
if (k > 10) *p++ = B64Chars[b];
*p++ = -,;
base64 = 0;
}
*p++ = ch;
if (ch == '&') *p++ = -;
}
if (base64) {
if (k > 10) *p++ = B64Chars[b];
*p++ = , _ .
}
*p++ = '\';
saferealloc ((void **) &buf, p - buf);
return buf;
bail:
safefree ((void **) &buf);
return 0;
}
Figure 2-2: String Encoding Conversion Procedure
20
Chapter 3
Implementation
Recently, several research groups have developed compilers that augment programs
written in unsafe languages such as C with dynamic checks that intercept out of
bounds array accesses and accesses via invalid pointers (we call such a compiler a
safe-C compiler) [3, 37, 23, 14, 28, 15]. These checks use additional information
about the (dynamic) layout of the address space to distinguish illegal accesses from
legal accesses. If the program fails a dynamic check, it terminates after printing an
error message.
Our implementation of boundless memory blocks for legacy C programs builds on
CRED, an existing safe-C compiler [28]. The basic idea behind our implementation is
to modify the generated code so that, instead of terminating the execution, it stores
out of bounds writes in a hash table and implements out of bounds reads by fetching
the stored values from the hash table. There are two primary issues, both of which
relate to the representation of pointers:
* Information Content: Most safe-C compilers change the representation of
pointers to enable the generated code to distinguish in bounds and out of bounds
pointers [23]. Some representations use a single error token to represent all out
of bounds pointers. Such representations are unsuitable for the implementation
of boundless memory blocks since they do not maintain enough information to
enable the generated code to identify the memory block and offset of the out
21
of bounds pointer. Our compiler therefore uses a pointer representation that
maintains enough information to retrieve the memory block and offset for each
out of bounds pointer.
* Memory Layout: Some safe-C compilers change the size of the pointer repre-
sentation, which in turn changes the memory layout of the legacy C program.
We decided to build on a safe-C compiler that leaves the memory layout intact,
in part because this enables us to support a larger range of legacy C programs.
Our compiler generates two kinds of code: checking code and continuation code.
The checking code detects out of bounds accesses; the continuation code accesses the
hash table and executes when the checking code detects an out of bounds access.
3.1 Checking Code
Our implementation uses a checking scheme originally developed by Jones and Kelly [15]
and then significantly enhanced by Ruwase and Lam [28]. The scheme is currently
implemented as a modification to the GNU C compiler (gcc). Jones and Kelly's
scheme maintains a table that maps locations to data units (each struct, array, and
variable is a data unit). It uses this table to track intended data units and distinguish
in-bounds from out-of-bounds pointers as follows:
* Base Case: A base pointer is the address of an array, struct or variable allo-
cated on the stack or heap, or the value returned by malloc. All base pointers
are in bounds. The intended data unit of the base pointer is the corresponding
array, struct, variable, or allocated block of memory to which it refers.
* Pointer Arithmetic: All pointer arithmetic expressions contain a starting
pointer (for example, a pointer variable or the name of a statically allocated
array) and an offset. We say that the value of the expression is derived from the
starting pointer. A derived pointer is in bounds if and only if the correspond-
ing starting pointer is in bounds and the derived pointer points into the same
22
data unit as the starting pointer. Regardless of where the starting and derived
pointers point, they have the same intended data unit.
* Pointer Variables: A pointer variable is in bounds if and only if it was assigned
to an in-bounds pointer. It has the same intended data unit as the pointer to
which it was assigned.
Jones and Kelly distinguish a valid out-of-bounds pointer, which points to the next
byte after its intended data unit, from an invalid out-of-bounds pointer, which points
to some other address not in its intended data unit. They implement this distinction
by padding each data item with an extra byte. A valid out-of-bounds pointer points to
this extra byte; all invalid out-of-bounds pointers have the value ILLEGAL (-2). This
distinction supports code that uses valid out-of-bounds pointers in the termination
condition of loops that use pointer arithmetic to scan arrays. Finally, Jones and
Kelly instrument the code to check the status of each pointer before it dereferences
it; attempting to dereference an out-of-bounds pointer causes the program to halt
with an error.
Jones and Kelly's scheme does not support programs that first use pointer arith-
metic to obtain a pointer to a location past the end of the intended data unit, then
use pointer arithmetic again to jump back into the intended data unit and access
data stored in this data unit. While the behavior of programs that do this is un-
defined according to the ANSI C standard, in practice many C programs use this
technique [28]. Ruwase and Lam's extension uses an out-of-bounds objects (OBs) to
support such behavior [28].
As in standard C compilation, in-bounds pointers refer directly into their intended
data unit. Whenever the program computes an out-of-bounds pointer, Ruwase and
Lam's enhancement generates an OOB object that contains the starting address of
the intended data unit and the offset from the start of that data unit. Instead of
pointing off to some arbitrary memory location outside of the intended data unit
or containing the value ILLEGAL (-2), the pointer points to the OOB object. The
generated code checks pointer dereferences for the presence of OOB objects and uses
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this mechanism to halt the program if it attempts to dereference an out-of-bounds
pointer. The generated code also uses OOB objects to precisely track data unit
offsets and appropriately translate pointers derived from out-of-bounds pointers back
into the in-bounds pointer representation if the new pointer jumps back inside the
intended data unit. In practice, this enhancement significantly increases the range
of programs that can execute without terminating because of a failed memory error
check [28]. This extension also has the crucial property that, unlike the Jones and
Kelly scheme, it maintains enough information to determine the memory block and
offset for each out of bounds pointer.
3.2 Continuation Code
Our implementation of the write continuation code stores the written value in a hash
table indexed under the memory block and offset of the write. For out of bounds reads
it looks up the accessed memory block and offset and returns the stored value if it is
present in the hash table. If there is no indexed value, the continuation code redirects
the read to a preallocated buffer of values. From the five open source applications
in our test suite, only Midnight Commander contains reads that were not previously
stored in the hash. For this application, we experimented with the following four
patterns of preallocated values:
1. A sequence that contains only zeroes.
2. A sequence that contains zeroes on even positions and ones on odd positions.
3. A sequence of pseudo-random values in the interval from 0 to 255
4. A sequence which contains zeroes on even positions, ones on odd positions which
are divisible by 3, and a sequence which iterates through all integers from 0 to
255 on the other positions.
On our standard usage workload, Midnight Commander executes successfully us-
ing any of the four patterns described above. However, since zero and one are by far
24
the most common values in computer programs [1], and since sometimes these man-
ufactured values are used to determine loop conditions (and cycling through small
integers increases the chance of having the computation hit upon a value that will
exit the loop), we decided to use the fourth pattern during our experiments.
To avoid memory leaks, it is necessary to manage the memory used to store out
of bounds writes in the hash table. Our implementation devotes a fixed amount of
memory to the hash table, in effect turning the hash table into a cache of out of
bounds writes. We use a least recently used replacement policy. It is possible for
this policy to lead to a situation in which an out of bounds read attempts to access
a discarded write entry. Our experimental results show that the distance (measured
in out of bounds memory accesses) between successive accesses to the same entry in
the hash table is relatively small and that our set of applications never attempts to
access a discarded write entry. We chose to use a fixed size cache (instead of some
other data structure that attempts to store all out of bounds writes until the program
deallocates the corresponding memory blocks) to eliminate the possibility of denial of
service attacks that cause the program to exhaust the available memory by generating
and storing a very large number of writes.
Our basic philosophy views out of bounds accesses not as errors but as normal,
although uncommon, events in the execution of the program. We acknowledge, how-
ever, that programmers may wish to be informed of out of bounds accesses so that
they can increase the size of the accessed memory block or change the program to
eliminate the out of bounds accesses. Our compiler can therefore optionally augment
the generated code to produce a log that identifies each out of bounds access. Each
entry in the log file contains the type of the out of bounds access (new write, over-
write, read from the cache, uninitialized read), its address in memory, its location
(source file and line number), the ID of the process that generated it, and the time at
which the out of bounds access was detected. Programmers can use this log to locate
and eliminate out of bounds accesses if desired.
25
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Chapter 4
Experience
We implemented a compiler that generates code for boundless memory blocks and
obtained several widely-used open-source programs with out of bounds memory ac-
cesses. Many of these programs are key components of the Linux-based open-source
interactive computing environment; many of the out of bounds accesses in these pro-
grams correspond to exploitable buffer overflow security vulnerabilities.
4.1 Methodology
We evaluate the behavior of three different versions of each program: the Standard
version compiled with a standard C compiler (this version is vulnerable to any out
of bounds accesses that the program may contain), the Check version compiled with
the CRED safe-C compiler [28] (this version terminates the program with an error
message at the first out of bounds access), and the Boundless version compiled with
our compiler (this compiler generates code to store out of bounds writes in a hash
table and return the values for corresponding out of bounds reads). We evaluate three
aspects of each program's behavior:
* Security and Resilience: We choose a workload that contains an input that
triggers known out of bounds memory accesses; this input typically exploits
a security vulnerability as documented by vulnerability-tracking organizations
such as Security Focus [30] and SecuriTeam [29]. We observe the behavior of
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the different versions on this workload, focusing on how the different programs
execute after the execution of the out of bounds accesses.
* Performance: We chose a workload that both the Standard and Boundless
versions can execute successfully (the memory errors in some programs com-
pletely disable the Check version). We use this workload to measure the request
processing time, or the time required for each version to process representative
requests. We obtain this time by instrumenting the program to record the time
when it starts processing the request and the time when it stops processing the
request, then subtracting the start time from the stop time.
* Standard Usage: When possible, we deploy the Boundless version of each pro-
gram as part of our normal computational environment. During this deployment
we present the program with a workload intended to simulate standard usage;
we also ensure that the workload contains attacks that trigger out of bounds
accesses in each program. We focus on the acceptability of the continued exe-
cution of the Boundless version of the deployed program.
We ran all the programs on a Dell workstation with two 2.8 GHz Pentium 4
processors, 2 GBytes of RAM, and running Red Hat 8.0 Linux.
4.2 Sendmail
Sendmail is the standard mail transfer agent for Linux and other Unix systems [33]. It
is typically configured to run as a daemon which creates a new process to service each
new mail transfer connection. This process executes a simple command language that
allows the remote agent to transfer email messages to the Sendmail server, which may
deliver the messages to local users or (if necessary) forward some or all of the messages
on to other Sendmail servers. Versions of Sendmail earlier than 8.11.7 and 8.12.9 (8.11
and 8.12 are separate development threads) have a memory error vulnerability which
is triggered when a remote attacker sends a carefully crafted email message through
the Sendmail daemon [32]. When Sendmail processes the message, the memory error
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causes it to execute the injected code in the message. The injected code executes
with the same permissions as the Sendmail server (typically root).
4.2.1 Security and Resilience
We worked with Sendmail version 8.11.6. With Standard compilation, we were able
to launch an attack that exploits the memory error to provide the attacker with a
root shell. The Check version exits with a memory error during initialization and fails
to operate at all. The Boundless version is not vulnerable to the attack - when sent
the attack message, the process servicing the remote connection does not provide the
attacker with a shell (root or otherwise). Instead, it executes through the memory
error triggered by the attack to continue to successfully process subsequent Sendmail
commands. We configured one version of the attack to address mail to a legitimate
user; in this case the Boundless version of Sendmail delivers the message to that
user (the message contains the injected code which would execute if the attack had
succeeded).
4.2.2 Performance
Table 4.1 presents the request processing times for the Standard and Boundless ver-
sions of Sendmail. The Receive Small request receives a message whose body is 4
bytes long; the Send Small request sends the same message. The Receive Large re-
quest receives a message whose body is 4 KB long; the Send Large request sends the
same message. We performed each request ten times and report the mean and the
standard deviation of the request processing times.
Table 4.1: Request Processing Time for Sendmail (ms)
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Request Standard Boundless Slowdown
Receive Small 230 ± 7.47% 803 ± 4.61% 3.49
Receive Large 230 i 19.29% 845 i 3.06% 2.82
Send Small 23.0 i 3.57% 88.0 ± 1.78% 3.82
Send Large 23.8 3.00% 90.5 i 0.60% 3.80
4.2.3 Standard Usage
For our standard usage workload, we installed the Boundless version of Sendmail
on one of our machines and we used it to process a set of one thousand messages,
composed of 960 valid messages and 40 attack messages (we sent one attack message
before every 24 valid messages). On this workload, Sendmail successfully executes
through the memory errors and correctly processes all the messages.
Our memory error logs indicate that Sendmail generates a steady stream of mem-
ory errors during its normal execution. In particular, every time the Sendmail daemon
wakes up to check for work, it generates a flurry of memory errors. We logged 12,056
out of bounds memory accesses. All of the out of bounds read accesses retrieved
values which had been previously stored in the hash table. Table 4.2 presents the
different types of out of bounds accesses generated by Sendmail for our workload.
Table 4.2: Out of Bounds Accesses in Sendmail
Out of bounds accesses 12,056
Out of bounds reads1 12,052
Out of bounds reads from hash 12,052
Out of bounds uninitialized reads 0
Out of bounds writes 2 4
New out of bounds writes in hash 4
Out of bounds overwrites in hash 0
4.3 Pine
Pine is a widely used mail user agent (MUA) that is distributed with the Linux
operating system [27]. Pine allows users to read mail, fetch mail from an IMAP
server, compose and forward mail messages, and perform other email-related tasks.
We use Pine 4.44, which is distributed with Red Hat Linux version 8.0. This version
of Pine has out of bounds accesses associated with a failure to correctly parse certain
2By 'reads' we denote those memory accesses which do not change the contents of the accessed
memory location.
2By 'writes' we denote those memory accesses which change the contents of the accessed memory
location.
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legal From fields; by sending a user an email message with a problematic From field,
it is possible for a remote attacker to exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary
code on the user's machine [26].
4.3.1 Security and Resilience
Our security and resilience workload contains an email message with a From field that
triggers this memory error. This workload causes the Standard version to corrupt
its heap and abort. The Check version detects the memory error and terminates the
computation with an error message identifying the error. With both of these versions,
the user is unable to use Pine to read mail because Pine aborts or terminates during
initialization as the mail file is loaded and before the user has a chance to interact
with the program. The user must manually eliminate the From field from the mail
file (using some other mail reader or file editor) before he or she can use Pine. While
the Check version protects the user against injected code attacks, it prevents the user
from using Pine to read mail as long as the mail file contains the problematic From
field.
The Boundless version, on the other hand, continues to execute through the out
of bounds accesses to enable the user to process their mail. This version processed
all of our workloads without errors.
4.3.2 Performance
Figure 4.3 presents the request processing time for the Standard and Boundless ver-
sions of Pine. The Read request displays a selected email message, the Compose
request brings up the user interface to compose an email message, and the Move
request moves a message from one folder to another. We performed each request
five times and report the mean and the standard deviation of the request processing
times.
As these numbers indicate, the Boundless version is substantially slower than the
Standard version for the Compose and the Move requests. However, because Pine
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Table 4.3: Request Processing Time for Pine (ms)
Request Standard Boundless Slowdown
Read 0.419 ± 1.88% 2.70 + 0.55% 6.46
Compose 0.897 + 1.35% 7.59 + 0.41% 8.47
Move 1.44 i 9.37% 1.86 ± 4.81% 1.29
is an interactive program, its performance is acceptable as long as it feels responsive
to its users. Assuming a pause perceptibility threshold of 100 milliseconds for this
kind of interactive program [6], it is clear that the application of boundless memory
blocks should not degrade the program's interactive feel. Our subjective experience
confirms this expectation: all pause times are imperceptible for all versions.
4.3.3 Standard Usage
For our standard usage workload, we used the Boundless version of Pine intensively for
one hour to read e-mail, reply to e-mails, forward e-mails, and manage e-mail folders.
To test Pine's ability to successfully execute through errors, we also periodically sent
ourselves an email that triggered the memory error discussed above in Section 4.3.1.
We configured this version of Pine to generate a memory error log file; during this
time we also observed several memory errors caused by errors other than the security
vulnerability discussed above.
Table 4.4: Out of Bounds Accesses in Pine
Out of bounds accesses 129
Out of bounds reads 38
Out of bounds reads from hash 38
Out of bounds uninitialized reads 0
Out of bounds writes 91
New out of bounds writes in hash 91
Out of bounds overwrites in hash 0
During this usage period, the Boundless version executed successfully through all
errors to perform all requests flawlessly.3 We logged 129 out of bounds accesses. Of
3These memory errors make the Check version unusable for reading remote mail files -it exits
32
these out of bounds accesses, 91 modified the accessed memory location and 38 did
not modify the accessed location. All of these latter 38 accesses accessed locations
previously stored in the hash table. Table 4.4 presents the different types of out of
bounds accesses generated by Pine for our workload.
4.4 Mutt
Mutt is a customizable, text-based mail user agent that is widely used in the Unix
system administration community [22]. It is descended from ELM [10] and supports a
variety of features including email threading and correct NFS mail spool locking. We
used Mutt version 1.4. As described at [21] and discussed in Section 2, this version
is vulnerable to an attack that exploits a memory error in the conversion from UTF-
8 to UTF-7 string formats. We were able to develop an attack that exploited this
vulnerability. It is possible for a remote IMAP server to use this attack to crash Mutt;
it may also be possible for the IMAP server to exploit the vulnerability to inject and
execute arbitrary code.
4.4.1 Security and Resilience
We configured our security and resilience workload to exploit the security vulnera-
bility described above. On this workload, the Standard version of Mutt exits with a
segmentation fault before the user interface comes up; the Check version exits with a
memory error before the user interface comes up. The memory error is triggered by a
carefully crafted mail folder name; when the Boundless version executes, it generates
an error message indicating that the mail folder does not exist, then continues to
execute to allow the user to successfully process mail from other folders.
whenever it attempts to access a remote mail file. It can, however, successfully process local mail
files as long as they do not contain a From field that triggers the memory error.
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4.4.2 Performance
Figure 4.5 presents the request processing time for the Standard and Boundless ver-
sions of Mutt. The Read request reads a selected email message and the Move request
moves a message from one folder to another. We performed each request five times
and report the mean request processing time.
Table 4.5: Request Processing Time for Mutt (s)
Request Standard Boundless Slowdown
Read 0.80 4- 0.78% 1.65 ± 0.87% 1.25
Move 7.40 ± 4.53% 9.29 ± 1.16% 2.06
Because Mutt is an interactive program, its performance is acceptable as long
as it feels responsive to its users. These performance results make it clear that the
application of boundless computing to this program should not degrade its interac-
tive feel. Our subjective experience confirms this expectation: all pause times are
imperceptible for both the Standard and Boundless versions.
Table 4.6: Out of Bounds Accesses in Mutt
Out of bounds accesses 38
Out of bounds reads 0
Out of bounds reads from hash 0
Out of bounds uninitialized reads 0
Out of bounds writes 38
New out of bounds writes in hash 38
Out of bounds overwrites in hash 0
4.4.3 Standard Usage
For our standard usage workload, we used the Boundless version of Mutt intensively
for half an hour to process email messages. During this time, we triggered the security
vulnerability described above twice. Mutt successfully executed through the resulting
memory errors to correctly execute all of our requests. We were able to read, forward,
and compose mail with no problems even after executing through the memory error.
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An examination of the memory error log indicates that all of the memory errors
were caused by the security vulnerability. We logged 38 out of bounds accesses, all
of which were writes. Table 4.6 presents the different types of out of bounds accesses
generated by Mutt for our workload.
4.5 Midnight Commander
Midnight Commander is an open source file management tool that allows users to
browse files and archives, copy files from one folder to another, and delete files [20].
Midnight Commander is vulnerable to a memory-error attack associated with access-
ing an uninitialized buffer when processing symbolic links in tgz archives [19]. We
used Midnight Commander version 4.5.55 for our experiments.
4.5.1 Security and Resilience
Our security and resilience workload contains a tgz archive designed to exploit this
vulnerability. On this workload, the Standard version terminates with a segmentation
violation when the user attempts to open the problematic tgz archive. Because
Midnight Commander has memory errors in its initialization code, the Check version
terminates with an error message before it finishes initialization. The result is that
the user is unable to use this version of Midnight Commander at all.
The Boundless version, on the other hand, initializes with no problems. When the
user attemp)ts to open the problematic tgz archive, Midnight Commander correctly
displays the names of the two symbolic links in the archive. Because these links point
off to non-existent files, Midnight Commander correctly displays an error message
when the user attempts to open them. Midnight Commander continues to execute
successfully throughout the entire session; in particular, the user can continue to use
Midnight Commander to browse, copy, or delete other files even after processing the
problematic tgz archive. For this workload (and for all others that we know of)
the application of boundless memory blocks enables Midnight Commander to exhibit
completely correct behavior with no degradation at all.
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4.5.2 Performance
Figure 4.7 presents the request processing time for the Standard and Boundless ver-
sions of Midnight Commander. The Copy request copies a 24Mbyte directory struc-
ture, the Move request moves a directory of the same size, the MkDir request makes
a new directory, and the Delete request deletes a 3.1 Mbyte file. We performed each
request five times and report the mean and the standard deviation of the request
processing times.
Table 4.7: Request Processing Time for Midnight Commander (ms)
As these numbers indicate, the Boundless version is not dramatically slower than
the Standard version. Moreover, because Midnight Commander is an interactive pro-
gram, its performance is acceptable as long as it feels responsive to its users, and these
performance results make it clear that the application of boundless memory blocks
to this program should not degrade its interactive feel. Our subjective experience
confirms this expectation: all pause times are imperceptible for both the Standard
and Boundless versions.
4.5.3 Standard Usage
For our standard usage workload, we used the Boundless version of Midnight Com-
mander intensively for one hour. During this session, we copied, moved, browsed,
and searched for files, and we created and deleted directories.
We configured this version of Midnight Commander to generate a memory er-
ror log; during this time we observed memory errors caused by coding errors other
than the security vulnerability discussed above. Based on our observations, Midnight
Commander generates memory errors every time it initializes, whenever it interacts
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Request Standard Boundless Slowdown
Copy 360 i 0.96% 516 1.28% 1.42
Move 0.451 i 1.43 % 0.586 2.02% 1.30
MkDir 0.829 i 1.95% 1.54 i 3.51% 1.86
Delete 2.41 ± 0.87% 2.50 1.73% 1.04
with the user through a dialog box, when it searches for a file, when it changes the
current directory, and occasionally for other user interactions. The Boundless version
executed successfully through all of these errors to perform flawlessly for all requests.
Table 4.8: Out of Bounds Accesses in Midnight Commander
Out of bounds accesses 16788
Out of bounds reads 16763
Out of bounds reads from hash 11301
Out of bounds uninitialized reads 5462
Out of bounds writes 25
New out of bounds writes in hash 1
Out of bounds overwrites in hash 24
During our one hour session, we logged a total of 16,788 out of bounds accesses,
of which 5,462 were reads to uninitialized locations. As we will discuss in Section 4.7,
Midnight Commander is the only benchmark that contains reads to locations that
were not previously written by a corresponding out of bounds write. All our other
benchmarks contain only reads to locations which were previously stored in the hash
table. Table 4.8 presents the different types of out of bounds accesses generated by
Midnight Commander for our workload.
4.6 Apache
The Apache HTTP server is the most widely used web server in the world; a recent
survey found that 64% of the web sites on the Internet use Apache [24]. The Apache
2.0.47 mod-alias implementation contains a vulnerability that, under certain circum-
stances, allows a remote attacker to trigger a memory error [2]. The vulnerability
reports indicate that this error may enable the remote attacker to inject and execute
arbitrary code on the Apache server [2].
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4.6.1 Security and Resilience
Our security and resilience workload contains a request that exploits the security
vulnerability described above. The Apache server maintains a pool of child processes;
each request is handled by a child process assigned to service the connection carrying
the request [25].
With Standard compilation, the child process terminates with a segmentation
violation when presented with the attack. The Apache parent process then creates a
new child process to take its place. The Check version correctly processes legitimate
requests without memory errors until it is presented with the attack. At this point
the child process serving the connection detects the error and terminates. The parent
Apache process then creates a new child process to take its place. In the Boundless
version, the child process executes successfully through the attack to correctly process
subsequent requests.
Because Apache isolates request processing inside a pool of regenerating processes,
the Check version eliminates the security vulnerability while enabling the server to
process subsequent requests. The overhead of killing and restarting child processes,
however, makes this version vulnerable to an attack that ties up the server by repeat-
edly presenting it with requests that trigger the error.
4.6.2 Performance
Figure 4.7 presents the request processing time for the Standard and Boundless ver-
sions of Apache. The Small request serves an 8KByte page (this is the home page
for our research project); the large request serves an 836KByte file used only for this
experiment. We performed each request five times and report the mean and the stan-
dard deviation of the request processing times. These numbers indicate that the use
of boundless memory blocks in this context entails a negligible slowdown, for both
small and large requests.
38
Table 4.9: Request Processing Time for Apache (ms)
Request Standard Boundless Slowdown
Small 180 i 0.65% 183 ± 0.64% 1.02
Large 339 + 0.26% 345 ± 0.14% 1.02
4.6.3 Standard Usage
For our standard usage workload, we used the Boundless version of Apache to serve
the web site of our research project. For one hour, we requested files from this web site,
periodically presenting the web server with requests that triggered the vulnerability
discussed above. The Boundless version executed successfully through all of these
attacks tlo continue to successfully service legitimate requests.
During our one hour session, we logged a total of 347 out of bounds accesses. All
the out of bounds read accesses retrieved values which were previously stored in the
hash table.
In addition to this workload, we used the Boundless version for one week to serve
all requests directed to our research project's web site. This web site was in more or
less steady use throughout this time period; we measured approximately 400 requests
a day from outside our institution. We also generated tens of thousands of requests
from another local machine, all of which were served correctly.
During this time period we periodically presented the web server with requests
that triggered the vulnerability discussed above. The Boundless version executed
successfully through all of these attacks to continue to successfully service legitimate
requests. We observed no anomalous behavior and received no complaints from the
users of the web site. Unlike some of our other programs, the memory error logs
indicate that Apache had no memory errors other than those caused by our attack
requests. Table 4.10 presents the different types of out of bounds accesses generated
by Apache for our workload.
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Table 4.10: Out of Bounds Accesses in Apache
Out of bounds accesses 347
Out of bounds reads 284
Out of bounds reads from hash 284
Out of bounds uninitialized reads 0
Out of bounds writes 63
New out of bounds writes in hash 32
Out of bounds overwrites in hash 31
4.7 Discussion
Our results show that boundless memory blocks enable our programs to execute
through memory-error based attacks to successfully process subsequent requests.
Even under very intensive workloads the Boundless versions provided completely ac-
ceptable results. We stress that we chose the programs in our study largely based on
several factors: the availability of source code, the popularity of the application, the
presence of known memory errors as documented on vulnerability-tracking web sites
such as Security Focus [30] and SecuriTeam [29], and our ability to reproduce the
documented memory errors. In all of the programs that we tested, Boundless com-
puting successfully eliminates the negative consequences of the error - the programs
were, without exception, invulnerable to known security attacks and able to execute
through the corresponding memory errors to continue to successfully process their
normal workload. These results provide encouraging evidence that the use of bound-
less memory blocks can go a long way towards eliminating out of bounds accesses as
a source of security vulnerabilities and fatal programming errors.
One interesting aspect of our results is that although our programs generated
out of bounds read accesses, in only one of these programs did any of these accesses
read uninitialized values that were not previously written by a corresponding out of
bounds write. This result indicates that developers are apparently more likely to
incorrectly calculate a correct size for an accessed memory block (or fail to include
a required bounds check) than they are to produce a program that incorrectly reads
an uninitialized out of bounds memory location.
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Chapter 5
Related Work
We discuss related work in the areas of memory-safe programming language imple-
mentations, traditional error recovery, and data structure repair.
5.1 Safe-C Compilers
Our work builds on previous research into implementing memory-safe versions of
C [3, 37, 23, 14, 28, 15]. As described in Section 3, our implementation uses tech-
niques originally developed by Jones and Kelly [15], then significantly refined by
Ruwase and Lam [28]. Memory-safe C compilers can use a variety of techniques for
detecting out of bounds memory accesses via pointers; all of these techniques modify
the representation of pointers in some way as compared to standard C compilers. To
implement boundless memory blocks it is essential that the pointer representation
preserve the memory block and offset information for out of bounds pointers.
It is also feasible to implement boundless memory blocks for safe languages such
as Java or ML by simply replacing the generated code that throws an exception in
response to an out of bounds access. The new generated code, of course, would store
out of bounds writes in the hash table and appropriately retrieve the stored value for
out of bounds reads.
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5.2 Traditional Error Recovery
The traditional error recovery mechanism is to reboot the system, with repair applied
during the reboot if necessary to bring the system back up successfully [12]. Mecha-
nisms such as fast reboots [31], checkpointing [17, 18], and partial system restarts [5]
can improve the performance of the reboot process. Hardware redundancy is the
standard solution for increased availability.
Boundless memory blocks differ in that they are designed to convert erroneous
executions into correct executions. The advantages include better availability because
of the elimination of down time and the elimination of vulnerabilities to persistent
errors -- restarting Pine as described in Section 4.3, for example, does not enable the
user to read mail if the mail file still contains a problematic mail message.
5.3 Static Analysis and Program Annotations
A combination of static analysis and program annotations should, in principle, enable
programmers to deliver programs that are completely free of out of bounds accesses.
CSSV uses programmer annotations to support an analysis that can statically find
all buffer overflow errors in C programs [9]. Fahndrich and Leino present an extended
type system that enables the compiler to statically verify the absence of null pointer
dereferences in Java programs [11]. Dhurjati, Kowshik, Adve, and Lattner present a
combination of language design techniques and static analysis to statically eliminate
bounds violations [8]. Xi presents a type system that ensures the absence of array
bounds errors [36]. All of these techniques share the same advantage (a static guaran-
tee that the program will not exhibit a specific kind of memory error) and drawbacks
(the need for programmer annotations and the possibility of conservatively rejecting
safe programs).
Researchers have also developed unsound, incomplete analyses that heuristically
identify potential out of bounds memory accesses [35, 4]. The advantage is that such
approaches typically require no annotations and scale better to larger programs; the
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disadvantage is that (because they are unsound) they may miss some out of bounds
accesses. Once again, boundless memory blocks differ from all of these techniques
in that they eliminate out of bounds accesses as an error rather than attempting to
detect or certify the absence of potentially out of bounds accesses.
5.4 Buffer Overflow Detection Tools
Researchers have developed techniques that are designed to detect buffer overflow
attacks after they have occurred, then halt the execution of the program before the
attack can take effect. StackGuard [7] and StackShield [34] modify the compiler
to generate code to detect attacks that overwrite the return address on the stack;
StackShield also performs range checks to detect overwritten function pointers.
It is also possible to apply buffer overflow detection directly to binaries. Purify
instruments the binary to detect a range of memory errors, including out of bounds
memory accesses [13]. Program shepherding uses an efficient binary interpreter to
prevent an attacker from executing injected code [16].
A key difference between these techniques and boundless memory blocks is that
boundless memory blocks prevent the attack from performing out of bounds writes
that corrupt the address space. These writes instead are redirected into the hash table
that holds the out of bounds writes. Of course, our implementation of boundless
memory blocks also generates a log file that identifies all out of bounds accesses,
enabling the programmer to go back and update the code to eliminate such accesses
if desired.
5.5 Extensible Arrays
Many languages provide extensible array data structures, which dynamically grow to
accomodate elements stored at arbitrary offsets. Boundless memory blocks are, in
effect, an implementation of extensible arrays. They differ from standard extensible
arrays in their tight integration with the C programming language (especially the
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preservation of the address space from the original legacy implementation). This
integration forces the compiler to make large scale changes to the generated code to
perform the required checks and integrate effectively with the low-level packages that
maintain information about out of bounds pointers and accesses.
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Appendix A
Request Processing Times (All
Measurements)
Table A. 1: Receive Requests in Sendmail - all measurements (ps)
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Receive Small Receive Large
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
239125 768168 267529 852687
267577 789174 296374 843536
242747 757481 325702 819378
225137 848461 460405 818175
234726 798887 268938 835721
212630 879602 259987 868751
206355 795144 312222 902899
221361 782940 254550 856501
237070 834096 285794 839855
213749 774003 267681 812343
Table A.2: Send Requests in Sendmail - all measurements (s)
Table A.3: Read, Compose and Move Requests in Pine - all measurements (s)
Table A.4: Read and Move Requests in Mutt - all measurements (s)
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Send Small Send Large
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
24196 86825 23450 90162
22479 87598 23535 90601
22502 87954 23169 90435
24318 87957 25484 90050
22520 86789 22970 89831
22100 87804 23896 90048
22839 88342 23747 90907
24345 92371 23434 91831
22765 88275 24672 90648
22554 86494 23527 90667
Read Request Compose Request Move Request
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
429 2719 890 7619 1466 1748
410 2702 892 7624 1404 1936
428 2706 880 7540 1388 1943
412 2686 909 7610 1684 1761
418 2730 912 7579 1275 1932
Read Request Move Request
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
802 1653 7552 9217
807 1622 7305 9283
790 1651 6809 9494
807 1662 7528 9228
803 1660 7805 9206
Table A.5: Copy and Move Requests in Midnight Commander -- all measurements
(Us)
Table A.6: Mkdir and Delete Requests in Midnight Commander - all measurements
(Us)
Table A.7: Small and Large Requests in Apache - all measurements (s)
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Copy Request Move Request
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
366698 528369 462 583
357430 509956 445 582
358492 514163 452 579
358993 511416 444 609
357721 518273 452 576
Mkdir Request Delete Request
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
817 1459 2420 2465
809 1504 2366 2573
830 1542 2423 2509
835 1583 2403 2480
856 1610 2416 2451
Small Request Large Request
Standard Boundless Standard Boundless
181000 183000 340000 344000
181000 182000 338000 345000
178000 185000 340000 345000
181000 184000 339000 345000
180000 182000 338000 344000
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